Prior to an analysis of glasnost-era posters, however, a brief examination of the way social ills were presented and discussed publicly in the pre-Gorbachev era is important to highlight. This can be done by scrutinizing a state-sponsored poster from 1972 that tackled the issue of alcoholism. Anti-alcoholism posters were common throughout the history of the Soviet Union, going back to at least 1930. The difference in message and tone with the anti-addiction posters of the glasnost era, however, is striking. The 1972 poster frames the issue of alcoholism not as a public health matter, or of its damage to the family, but as an issue of Soviet citizens shirking their duty to work. The title of the poster, "Shame to the loafer and drunkard," makes this clear. 1 According to the Soviet Union of 1972, alcoholism was a threat to the state. Its interfamily and physical/mental health ramifications were not presented as the central issue. This was largely how social ills were dealt with in the Soviet Union in the pre-glasnost era, if they were attended to at all. More often than not, if concerns of society were a point of discussion in the Soviet Union, it was framed as a sin against the state. Often, however, concerns impacting the life of the population was simply not discussed at all, which the openness of 1 "Shame to the loafer and the drunkard," Soviet Union, courtesy of the Wende Museum, Los Angeles, CA, 1972. glasnost implicitly confessed. Whether public concerns dealing with alcoholism, divorce, etc.
was something Gorbachev predicted would occur is not precisely known. Nevertheless, discussions regarding such matters were exactly what transpired. For the first time in the history of the Soviet Union, and to a great extent the entire history of Russia, free expression exploded into the public sphere in the 1980s and the most fundamental and important topics that mattered to the people of the Soviet Union came out into the open.
Drug addiction had not been discussed openly during the Soviet era until glasnost. In what could be interpreted as a polar opposite approach regarding dependency from the 1972 poster, a 1989 drug abuse poster, stating "Drug Abuse is Suicide," framed the concern as being about individuals. 2 Gone were accusations of loafing and failing one's obligation to the state. In its place was the image of a human figure trapped inside a syringe, with the head being crushed as the plunger-actually, the man's feet-is pressed. The image is strong in its cleverness and simplicity, and underscores the impact of drug abuse on the actual addict versus the broader community or the state. The different tact taken in the piece, versus the 1972 alcohol addiction poster, displayed the matter of drug abuse to be one of individual health, safety, and happiness. It emphasized that addiction touches upon the personal rather than the political or ideological. Whatever truth exists pertaining to drug addiction as a drain on the state in terms of resources, diminished production through diminished labor, etc., the "Drug Abuse is Suicide" poster spoke to the subject at the level of the individual person. The choice of utilizing the word "suicide" itself emphasized the individual psychology being promoted during glasnost. While it was hoped the Soviet Union would be strengthened through glasnost and perestroika, and therefore a stronger and more unified Soviet state would emerge, the underlying expression coming out of the openness of glasnost was the expression of the individual. Particular problems were suddenly being publicly wrestled with by particular members of society. People were now addressing issues through the language and advocacy of individuals rather than the collective. This was an altogether new aspect of Soviet life that was developing in the second half of the 1980s.
Among the largest domestic problems the Soviet Union faced for essentially the entirety of its history was divorce. Originally, in the early years of the Soviet Union, when it was still shining in the light of victory and success in its revolution and civil war, the Soviet Union sought to ease divorce for both sexes. No-fault divorce was not merely suddenly allowed, but was practically encouraged. Bourgeoisie notions of marriage with traditional gender roles, including the subservient role of women, were rejected and a new era in which men and women would be economic and social equals was facilitated, in part, through an easing of divorce in the early twentieth century. Life, 1917 Life, -1936 , notes that besprizorniki resorted to begging, stealing, and con-artistry to survive in the first few decades of the twentieth century. Goldman states that the orphan population "joined gangs specializing as apartment burglars, bazaar crooks, garret thieves, railway pilferers, suitcase lifters, swindlers, cheats, and sharps. They perfected elaborate begging ruses and pickpocketing schemes, mimicking deformities, singing obscene ditties, and using smaller children and baby dolls to evoke sympathy among passersby."
5 Divorce was no small contributor to this abandonment of thousands of children.
The chaos caused by no-fault divorce, erasure of traditional gender roles, and the encouragement of women to enter the workforce was not the communist ideal which had been hoped for. As a result, the government eventually made divorce more difficult legally and the practice became, to some degree, culturally shameful. Women's roles as workers were deemphasized and their roles as wives and mothers were re-asserted, even as they continued to fill many jobs in factories and other settings. The Soviet Union had seen high rates of divorce for decades, despite the state's negative proclamations regarding it and despite its supposed difficulty. The reality and the aims of the policies were at times divergent. Though divorces were meant to be made difficult through excessive paperwork and hoop-jumping, court records have shown that judges generally granted appeals for divorce. The realities of the high divorce rate could thus be discussed openly in the 1980s due to glasnost, and its impact on Russian children, similarly not discussed openly until the era of openness, is likewise stressed in the image of the poster. industry. Furthermore, it targets not only the state and industry, but the wealthy elite of the Soviet Union's inner circle who wreaked havoc upon the environment for revenue as well as beautification of their personal estates. Glasnost brought not only a new ability to reveal longburied history and the ability to examine concerns in the domestic sphere through a public forum.
It also facilitated a new-found ability for people of little means who historically had no voice to make waves and criticize the most powerful members of Soviet society. Suddenly Soviet citizens of modest backgrounds were not only disparaging prominent figures of government and industry, they were being actively encouraged to do so. They may not have been naming names, but a long-closed society suddenly speaking about issues so openly meant that names were of little importance. Everyone seemed to understand the message and the context.
While glasnost and perestroika were often touted simultaneously, their agendas were often separate. Glasnost was meant to address the need for more openness by the Soviet government in the form of more transparency and was similarly encouraged by the general population through a liberalized policy of free speech, free press, and free expression. Gorbachev's interest in ramping down militarism and putting an end to the nuclear arms race was informed by this general desire to put the Soviet economy in a new direction. Liberalization of American goods in the Soviet marketplace further emphasized both a longing to empower the Soviet economy and press the reset button on U.S./Soviet relations, which had been running cold for about half a century until he entered office.
The policy of glasnost liberalized the Russian population in ways which were perhaps not foreseen by Gorbachev as well. In the name of creating a renaissance of diplomacy and a refreshed friendship with the West, particularly Britain and the United States, Gorbachev encouraged a similar openness and energizing of policy domestically by liberalizing rights of speech and expression. Doing so created an avenue for long-ignored-or even buried-social ills to be openly discussed, for the impact of industry on the environment to be considered for the first time, and for the Soviet worker to be celebrated not as a servant of the state but as an individual with unique and celebrated qualities.
Gorbachev authorized these policies with the intention of broadening and strengthening the Soviet Union's presence and credibility on the world stage, and creating a modern Soviet economy. Instead, the blooming of liberalism in the Soviet Union, both social and economic, precipitated its fall in a matter of less than a decade following the introduction of said policies.
The primary sources referenced in this work, public-service posters of the glasnost/perestroika era, reveal the sudden shift in Russian culture in the late 1980s. What many, including Mikhail Gorbachev, saw in the glasnost era was a new beginning. It was, in reality, a fascinating end; the end of the Soviet era, punctuated and defined by new social and economic freedoms which celebrated the cause of a new Soviet communism. It was a new Soviet system which hastened its own demise.
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